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Summary  findings
The postwar experience of the Japanese banking system  has  than those that did not.
received  considerable  attention recently  partly because  *  The establishment of procedures for punishing
conditions  in defeated  Japan in 1945 (including  high  defaulting borrowers helped the development of the
inflanon  and the need to switch from a military  to a civilian  payments system.
economy)  are similar  to those in transition  economies  today.  Limits on the amount of lending to related parties
Policymakers in transition economies can learn a good  appear to have contributed to financial stability (and
deal from the experiences of Japan's  postwar financial  could have contributed more if the newer "zaibatsu" had
system bLIt should remember that Japan also experienced  been as prudent as the older ones).
extraordinary  industrial growth and financial institution  *  Bank bailouts without accompanying reform (such
building in the late nineteenthi and early twentieth  as those the Bank of Japan undertook in 1920 and  1922)
centuries. Lessons to be learned from that experience  probably increased the likelihood of a more serious
inclide  the following:  crisis, such as that of 1927.
* Businiess  conglomerates that did not continue  to  *  Capital standards - the minimum capital
depend on governmient patronage were more successful  requirements established in the 1927 law - were a
than others in making the transition to a modern  viable means of encouraging bank consolidation and
industrial econiomy.  more prudent lending.
- Banks that made a conscious effort to reduce their  - The public financial system served as a buffer when
dependence on central bank credit were more successful  the banking sector was downsized.
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DiscussionThe postwar experience  of the Japanese  banking  system and its relevance  to developing  and transition
economies  has been  receiving  considerable  attention  recently.'  This research  has been  motivated  in part by
the fact  that the conditions  in the defeated  Japan  of 1945  are similar  to those in transition  economies  today,
such as high inflation  and the  need  to switch  from  a military  to a civilian  economy.
At the same time many of the postwar  conditions  in Japan were different from those faced by
transition  economies  today. Prior to World  War II Japan had spent more than sixty years experimenting
with and developing  modem financial institutions.  This essay relates some highlights  of that history,
concentrating  on the banks  that sprung  up from the large  industrial  conglomerates-zaibatsu.
How did the zaibatsu  banks,  the predecessors  of the main banks  of the postwar  era, perform?  They
performed  very well relative  to their competitors  and much  differently  relative  to their postwar  successors.
Looking  at the prewar  setting  also permits  an exploration  of banking  stability.  While  the postwar  Japanese
system has been free of major bank failures,  the prewar banking  system experienced  numerous  banking
panics  and failures,  even  among  zaibatsu  banks.
The Main Bank  System  and Important  Supplements
The  views  expressed  represent  those of the author  and not the Federal  Reserve  Bank of New  York  or the
Federal  Reserve  System.
' See, for example,  the World  Bank working  papers on the Japanese  main bank system  by Aoki, Patrick,
and Sheard  (1994).
1Theoretically, the main  bank system refers to a network of bank-firm relationships in which most large
firms have a main bank. The main bank can be identified by three principal qualities. It is the largest lender
to a particular client, making between 15 and 25 percent of the loans to that client, and possibly more to
many small companies. It holds a substantial block of shares in the client company and is always the largest
financial shareholder, although it is often not the largest shareholder (because of ceiling regulations of 5 or
10  percent).  And  bank  officers  are  commonly represented in the  management of  its bank's  clients,
particularly during times of financial distress.  Proponents  of the main bank system point to its strengths,
such as the active role taken in disciplining management, reduced costs of reorganizing and restructuring
firms in financial distress and thus reduced loan premiums, and  lower agency costs of external finance
(Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard 1994). Even the nonexclusivity features, some of which are guided by external
regulations and can be motivated by managerial risk aversion, can be positive. 2 If firms borrow from several
banks, they can discourage opportunism on the part of the main bank. Also, other banks become an integral
part of the main bank system by monitoring the main bank.
Important additions to this theoretical construct have been made, some of which were needed for
the system to function effectively. For example, the postwar Japanese development banks were critically
important, especially if long-term credit banks are considered to be development banks. Development banks
provided a much larger percentage of long-term finance than did the zaibatsu banks in postwar Japan,
allowing the zaibatsu banks to lower their burden of maturity transformation. During the high-growth era
long-term credit banks provided more than 50 percent of the loans for plant and equipment investment in
2One common  regulation among many financial systems limits the  exposure that any  one  financial
institution can have to one borrower. In the United States, according to the  1982 Banking Act, national
banks can lend no more than  15 percent of their capital to any single borrower on unsecured (marketable
securities) loans. In Japan, according to the thirteenth clause of the Revised Banking Act of 1980,  city, trust,
and  long-term credit  banks are allowed to  lend no more than 20,  30, and 40  percent of their  capital,
respectively, to any one company.
21956 for many key  industries. In  1966 they still provided 36 percent of all  plant and equipment loans
(Packer  1994b).3 Development banks did not play as important a role in the prewar financial system of
Japan.
The banks also had to be concentrated and profitable. Often in a main bank system a main bank
takes over some of the bad loans of other banks, which can be modeled as part of a dynamic equilibrium.
But if the sector is not profitable, in particular if a main bank is not profitable, then it is not likely to be able
to fulfill this function for large quantities of nonperforming loans. This inability is what many notice around
the edges of the Japanese main bank system today (Packer 1994a).
The system must also be able to credibly threaten businesses that fail with penalties, othervise  it
runs the risk of offering soft budget constraints. The incentives for Japanese firms to cooperate with their
banks in times of distress are increased by the fact that if they go bankrupt, the managers will be fired, and
the shareholders will not be compensated.
Zaibatsu and Zaibatsu Banks
Morikawa has defined zaibatsu as "a group of diversified businesses owned exclusively by a single family
or extended family." 4 In the late nineteenth century, during the early stages of industrialization, the zaibatsu
did not dominate leading growth areas such as electric power and cotton spinning. And although zaibatsu
did reorganize as more loosely knit networks after the dissolution of the holding companies (during the U.S.
occupation), today they are very different institutions  (Hadley 1970).
3The  literature on the role on development banks in Japan's postwar era  is growing.  Calomiris and
Himmelberg (1994), Horiuchi and Sui (1993), and Vittas and Kawaura (1994) cover the role of the Japan
Development Bank; Packer (1994b) covers the long-term credit banks.
4The  following discussion of the role and evolution of zaibatsu banks draws heavily on Morikawa (1992),
particularly Chapter 4.
3Nonetheless,  many of the names of the early zaibatsu are still familiar today. According to
Morikawa  most of the principal  zaibatsu  were originally  political  merchants-either financiers  handling  tax
revenues  or enterprises  selling  other goods  to the government.  In the preindustrial  era Mitsui,  the second
oldest of the major zaibatsu, collected tax revenues  from the economic zone around Osaka for the
government  located  in what is now Tokyo.  Rather  than  transport  the cash directly  to the government,  they
purchased  promissory  notes that merchants  in Edo had written for purchases  of Osaka goods.  They then
took these notes  to Tokyo,  collected  from Edo  merchants,  and reimbursed  the government.  Yasuda  was also
in the exchange business, although it is a zaibatsu that was founded much later. Zaibatsu that were
originally  political  merchants  sold other goods  to the government,  such as military  goods.  Mitsubishi,  for
example,  provided  shipping  services  for the government  and was granted  a monopoly.  Other zaibatsu had
their  origins  as mining  companies,  such as the oldest,  Sumitomo.
Although  some of the zaibatsu  were established  after the industrialization  and modernization  of the
late nineteenth  century,  all of the banks  were founded  by the early  Meiji era.  The zaibatsu  that had begun  as
financiers--Mitsui  and Yasuda-were the first to start  banks,  followed  by Mitsubishi  and Sumitomo.  These
four  served  as the major  zaibatsu  banks  through  the war  era.
Many zaibatsu  failed, particularly  if they fell out of favor with the early Meiji government.  The
successful  zaibatsu were those that were less dependent  on government  patronage.  In fact, many made
deliberate efforts to transfer out of the traditional businesses  that depended on government  patronage.
Relatively  early in the Meiji  era Mitsui closed its bank branches  that accommodated  the government  and
eliminated  many bad debts that were actually  kickbacks  to the government.  Mitsubishi,  after making a
fortune  from its shipping  monopoly,  downsized  this business  substantially  after the government  began  to
intervene.  Yasuda,  like Mitsui, also reduced  its government  deposits.  The success  of the zaibatsu  was not
4dependent on  large-scale privatization efforts: several zaibatsu that  were privatized  failed  and  several
succeeded.
The four major zaibatsu  banks grew very rapidly, mirroring the growth of the zaibatsu. A few
important aspects of their evolution should be mentioned. At the turn of the century Mitsui underwent a
transition from an industrial to a commercial bank. At first, Mitsui bank had lent principally to companies
of its own zaibatsu: more than 80 percent of their long-term loans were extended to Mitsui members. When
a  large proportion of these  funds became uncollectible and this  knowledge became public (in the late
nineteenth century), deposits fell considerably. During a transition in leadership, a decision was made to
greatly reduce the long-term loans disbursed to companies in their owi  group, and reported profits rose
considerably.
In the four biggest banks efforts were made to reduce loan-to-deposit ratios as well as dependence
on Bank of Japan credits. By the turn of the century Mitsui and Sumitomo were borrowing virtually nothing
from the Bank of Japan. In all four banks profits grew considerably, while loans as a percentage of deposits
decllined.
Limiting lending to related customers came to be considered a natural, prudential policy. In 1890
the government passed a  law  limiting lending to related firms to  10 percent of capital. This law was
repealed in  1895, principally because the banking industry protested vigorously. But at the same time the
major zaibatsu banks developed their own lending policies much along the same lines.
Mitsui  Bank was a  prime  example.  It  issued a  representative public  statement in  1904: "It's
extremely unsound and improper for Mitsui to invest in its own enterprises' funds received on deposit from
others." The  bank  increased  investmenit and  loans  in  electric power  companies,  railways,  and  local
government operations that were outside of its group. By the early 1920s it was lending to only two of the
nine  major affiliates of the Mitsui group. A very small percentage of the  liabilities of Mitsui zaibatsu
5companies came from borrowing, and an even smaller percentage of these consisted of borrowing from the
Mitsui Bank. In the Mitsubishi zaibatsu only Mitsubishi Trading borrowed from the bank, and corporate
bonds were underwritten for only two of their subsidiaries.  Sumitomo also set limits on internal lending.
Clearly, the major zaibatsu banks were making a deliberate effort not to be viewed as organ banks.
Because this was an era where many banks failed, it was very important to develop the reputation for having
a good set of internal prudential guidelines that governed lending behavior. In the late nineteenth century
Mitsui had seen that a reputation for having nonperforming loans could lead to a decrease in deposits. Some
of the troubled banks in Japan today may have wished that they had adopted in the  1980s some of the
policies of the 1930s.
By 1932 loans were a fairly small percentage of large Japanese firms' finance (Hoshi  1993). This
low percentage was partly the result of the policy shifts undertaken by Japanese banks in the early twentieth
century to limit the growth of internal loans from zaibatsu banks. Of course, during the war and then in the
postwar era, things looked very different. But Japan's prewar banking experience may carry its own set of
lessons for transition economies.
The "Hard" Japanese Bankruptcy System and its Historical Origins
The origins of the "hard" bankruptcy system can also be found during Japan's early industrialization. This
system would later influence the evolution of the main bank system. Active bank governance during times
of financial distress is encouraged by a hard bankruptcy system.  The fewer alternatives the firmn  has (to its
bank), the more likely it is to depend on its bank, and the greater latitude the bank has to impose its own
solution to financial distress.
"One recent approach to creating a hard budget constraint in Hungary has been the creation of a hard
bankruptcy law (Caprio 1994).
6Application to bankruptcy court in Japan is discouraged by the large up-front deposit payments
required from the applicant. And even if the debtor can come up withi  the money, judges refuse to hear a
large majority of the cases that come before them. They often refuse the bankruptcy application and refuse
to  issue  a  stay  of  creditor  claims.  Further,  management  and  shareholders  are  punished  severely.
Management is usually fired, and shareholders are not compensated (Packer and Ryser 1993).
Another  distinguishing characteristic of the Japanese bankruptcy system  is that  more  than  90
percent of bankruptcies fall under the category "suspension of bank transactions." If a clearinghouse tvice
issues a notice of bills unpaid within a six-month period, all banks must suspend loans and current account
transactions  with  the  guilty  party  for  two  years.  Because Japanese companies  are  so  dependent on
promissory  notes  to  conduct  transactions,  suspending loans  and  current account  transactions  is  the
equivalent of capital punishment for the firm-it  cannot survive if bank transactions are suspended. For this
reason it is considered to be a category of bankruptcy by Japan's mercantile credit rating agencies.
The suspension mechanism originated early in Japanese industrialization  (Ryser 1993). the  Tokyo
clearinghouse was established in 1891 by eleven banks, and its purpose was to net bills and checks from
companies across banks. 6 Generally, the bills and checks presented to the clearinghouse would represent
claims on the firm, which could be drawvn  from a current account at its transaction bank about six months
after issue. Even today, most small and medium-size Japanese companies are financed largely by trade
credit through the issuance of promissory notes of this sort.
After  the  establishment  of  the  clearinghouse,  banks  could  submit  promissory  notes  to  the
clearinghouse, which would net the claims and debts, allowing each bank to settle from its account at the
Bank of Japan.
6Osaka  established a  similar sort of clearinghouse earlier-in  1879-but  reorganized it following the
Tokyo model in 1896.
7The historical record shows that the punishment for dishonored bills-when  a firm did not have
enough money in its account at the transaction bank to cover the obligation-gradually  increased during the
Tokyo clearinghouse's first ten years. In 1894 if a dishonored note was reported to the clearinghouse a firm
was suspended until a single bank asked for its release. In 1898 the rule was changed to require a majority
of the members of the clearinghouse to request the release. Two years later the clearinghouse began fining
members that had extended a loan to or otherwise dealt with suspended parties.
What  followed in  1901 appears,  in retrospect, to  have  been the  most  important of  the  new
rules-mandated  public  disclosure of  the  suspension. Disclosure  helped to  make  suspension a  harsh
punishmenit:  not only member banks, but all other creditors, including trade creditors that might othervise
accept fiuture  promissory notes, would know about the deterioration of the firm's finances. In 1904 repeat
offenders were forced to wait two years before being able to appeal the suspension.
Suspension and  dishonor  rates  dropped dramatically  in  response to these  changes  in  regime.
Defaulted bills as a percentage of total bills cleared dropped from 0.3 to 0. I percent following the decision
to publicly disclose suspension, and dropped to .05 percent in 1904. Meanwhile, the values of bills cleared
multiplied and the use of promissory notes as a means of payment in Japan took off.
The Interwar Banking System and Financial Stability
The interwar era was a time  in which  several real and financial shocks hit the financial system. Most
notably, the great Kanto earthquake struck in  1923, killing 140,000 people and causing property losses
estimated to be about 40 percent of GNP. The earthquake immediately created a class of debt that couldn't
be  paid  back.  This  debt  overhang  destabilized  the  entire  banking  sector  until  drastic  reform  and
consolidation measures were taken in the late 1920s. Although bank panics occurred throughout the early
twentieth century, the frequency and severity increased with the 1920s and culminated in the grand banking
8panic of 1927, which helped to stimulate a new banking act. Finally, there wvas  an ill-timed return to the
gold standard in 1930, which was highly deflationary.
But even during this era of financial volatility the stock of private financial assets as a proportion of
GNP increased dramatically-from  around I percent in 1918 to about 2.5 percent in 1933 (Teranishi 1990).
Time deposits in particular increased. Achieving a similar level of financial deepening after the postwar
hyperinflation took more than twenty-five years. Financial deepening amid instability was achieved because
alternative safe havens were available: the established zaibatsu banks and the postal savings system.
Also during the interwar era differences between the first- and second-tier zaibatsu became more
apparent. The large zaibatsu were very conservative during the boom of World War 1, and they benefitted
from their conservatism in the unstable 1920s (Morikawa 1992). NVhile  firms of the large zaibatsu increased
their use of bond and equity markets and the established banks increased their underwriting activities, many
of the  newer zaibatsu  formed banks and  achieved high war-time growth.  But this  growth was mostly
leveraged to their related banks. The zaibatsu of Furukawa, Kawasaki, and Suzuki all had trouble in the
1920s because of their over-leveraged position; some of the newer zaibatsu banks, such as Asano and
Fujita, failed.
The established zaibatsu  banks increased their market  share of deposits, as these  banks  were
perceived to be secure. Their  loan-deposit ratios were much lower than those of other banks, and they
expanded their underwriting and securities business. They increased their corporate bond holdings more
rapidly than their loans. The conservatism of zaibatsu banks was shown by the striking increase in bond
issues and the transformation of the capital structure of large corporations (Hoshi 1993).
9The 1927 banking crisis led to substantial reform. Although there had been many banking panics
prior to 1927, in most of these the Bank of Japan had stepped in and provided emergency funding. 7 This
funding was extensive during the panic of 1920. Further, the Bank of Japan had provided large amounts of
special loans to banks in the wake of the Great Kanto Earthquake. Teranishi (1990) claims that providing
rescue credits greatly increased the Bank of Japan's risk-taking prior to the 1927 crisis, thus increasing the
ultimate bill. The cost of rescuing or handling the failed banks in 1927 is estimated to have been 5 percent
of GNP.
Which banks failed during the 1927 crisis? Part of the folklore of the 1927 banking crisis held that
it was triggered  by irrational runs that  had  little to  do with  the underlying solvency of the  financial
institutions. Amid a debate about bad earthquake bills, the Minister of Finance set off a run on one Tokyo
bank early  in  1927 when  he testified before the Diet that  the bank had failed. But the  bank was still
honoring bills. Runs on eleven other banks followed shortly thereafter. A few months later another crisis
was triggered by a  Diet debate on the same topic-twenty-one  banks failed.8 But Yabushita and Inoue
(1993) have shown that the occurrence of bank runs was hardly random: proxies of solvency-such  as
dependence on the call market, the capital-deposit ratio, or the profit-capital ratio-were  all  negatively
related to the probability of closing. Further, Teranishi (1990) showed that most of the banks that failed in
1927 had high debt exposure to related firms.
Banking reform, which had  been in the works for while, was greatly accelerated by  the  1927
banking crisis. A  new banking law was passed soon after and came into effect  in January  1928. The
7Yabushita and Inoue (1993) identify eighteen banking crises between the 1890s and 1927. At least eight
appear to meet the Calomiris and Gorton (1991) definition of a "bank panic"-they  involved a large number
of banks in a brief time period and resulted in the suspension of convertibility, govemment relief measures,
or both.
8The  Bank of Taiwan failed when large city banks cut off loans to it in the call market.
10minimum capital requirement was increased from I  to 2 million yen for ordinary banks in Osaka and
Tokyo. Banks were also required to become joint stock companies. Under these new requirements at least
half of all banks were no longer eligible to function (Yabushita and Inoue 1993). There was also a move
toward tougher collateral requirements in money markets.
After the 1927 reform the number of banks decreased dramatically-from  about 1,400 at the end of
1927, to 600 in 1933, and 357 in 1940.9  The trend toward concentrating the Japanese banking system-a
central feature of the postwar Japanese banking system-started  well before Japan's war economy. To the
extent that the banking law passed in 1927 played a role, it may be worth examination by today's transition
economies.
Teranishi (1977) documents that during the era of financial instability and rapid consolidation, the
postal savings system grew dramatically as local banks went out of business. About 65 percent of the time
savings deposits that left the local banking sector went into the postal savings system. While the zaibatsu
banks gradually increased their share of deposits through the twentieth century, this event  was largely
independent of the consolidation of the banking sector and the fall in the number of banks. Zaibatsu banks
"found it the best policy not to  involve themselves in the structural change among local banks." Rather,
postal savings served as the principal safe haven for risk-averse depositors, particularly when consolidation
accelerated  after  1927. Likewise, the  official  financial system (Treasury  investments and  loans), the
principal outlet for postal savings funds during this era, handled the provision of funds owned by the failed
local banks.
Lessons of the Prewar Experience for Transition Economies
9The greatest number of banks was 1,867, reached in 1901. The government took several measures to
promote consolidation in the early twentieth century (Yabushita and Inoue 1993).
11Although policymakers in transition countries can learn a great deal from the experiences of the postwar
financial system in Japan, they should keep in mind that Japan also experienced extraordinary industrial
growth and financial institution building in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Keeping this
caveat in mind, at least seven stylized facts are worthy of note.
First, business conglomerates that did not continue to depend on government patronage were more
successful than others in making the transition to a modern industrial economy. Second, banks that made a
conscious effort to lower their dependence on central bank credit were more successful than those that did
not. Third, the establishment of procedures for punishing defaulting borrowers had a beneficial impact on
the development of the payments system. Fourth, limits on the amounts of lending to related parties appear
to have contributed to financial stability (and could have contributed more if the newer zaibatsu had been as
prudent as thie  older zaibatsu). Fifth, bank bailouts without accompanying reforms, such as those undertaken
by the Bank of Japan in 1920 and 1922, probably increased the likelihood of a more serious crisis, such as
that  of  1927.  Sixth,  capital  standards-the  minimum  capital  requirements established  in  the  1927
laN,L-vere a viable means of encouraging ban}k  consolidation and more prudent lending. Finally, the public
financial system served as a buffer when the banking sector was downsized.
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